Perception (warning - deep and potentially dull)

[Quina]

Don't worry, the real world is useless to me.

[Jinpachi Mishima]

I think it's got a lot to do that, and with "the unknowability of absolute truth", or the subjectivity of each person's perception of reality - since basically everything we see, think, feel, read, experience etc is influenced, in our thoughts, by cultural factors and constructs.

This quote, an excerpt from this, was brought up in my jurisprudence class during a discussion of modernism, structuralism, post-structuralism and postmodernism.

Personally, I've always felt that perception is always distorted in the human mind. Think about it. The brain is an imperfect organism. It mutates, forgets and invents memories. We only "see" a small percentage of visual spectrum, the same applies on the aural spectrum too. We can "pick up" an incredible amount of data without realising it, but our consciousness, influenced by culture, context and an imperfect brain, has to "sort through" all this information, make it manageable.

So, considering all this, truly what can we believe in? Is seeing truly believing? Or as Big D puts, is absolute truth (if there is such a thing) unknowable to our senses and perceptions?

[Old Manus]

[o_O]

I agree and disagree. Obviously, you cannot have an act of perception that is not contingent, because the very idea of contingency is that it is a consequence of the given circumstances.

Take the scenario of a drunken looking man walking along in front of me:

My perception of that guy as drunk is contingent of his stumbling like an idiot. My cognition of that guy as drunk is contingent of my perception that he has drunk that half empty bottle of whiskey.
I have also mediated that he may not have drunk it, but merely poured out, but as the evidence of his unsteadiness contradicts this perception, I percieve the former.
A perception cannot be unsituated, much less a cognition, because to be situated is to be under the given circumstances which contingency is derived from, and whatever circumstances this may be, context is the summation of them. in this instance, yes, my cognition is 'theory-soaked', so to speak, because I have deliberated and used my knowledge of the effect of alcohol upon people. I have used my judgement of whether or not he has drunk half the bottle of whiskey.

Now take this example. Assume somebody who was brought up in a severely racist community, sees somebody of a different race and immediately thinks negatively of them:

Now, when applied to the proposition, it is much weaker, the perception of that person as of a lower culture is contingent of, well, nothing really, except that that's what they've always thought.
It's not mediated either, because this person never thought "They might not actually be a sub-human race".
The context and situation of this perception is a direct consequence of the circumstances in which this person was raised.
There is no theory-soaking going on here though. Does this person really know why they hate other cultures, or are they merely imprinted with the views of their guardians and/or peers?

So while this proposition can be true, it isn't true for every situation, as it states, but, from a logical standpoint, it is in fact a tautology, by definition. In my opinion, anyway. (Hooray for logic! )

Let "All perceptions and cognitions are contingent, mediated, situated, contextual, theory-soaked" = the set A.
Let "All perceptions and cognitions are contingent" = p.
mediated = q.
situated = r.
contextual = s.
theory-soaked = t.
"If p and q and r and s and t are true, then A is true."

([p^q]^[(r^s)^t]) ↔ A

So, if "([p^q]^[(r^s)^t])" equates to true, "A" equates to true.
If "([p^q]^[(r^s)^t])" equates to false, we cannot say anything about "A", and therefore must assume it to be true.